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A large proportion of the least developed countries are landlocked and their access to 
world markets depends on the availability of a trade corridor and transit systems. Based 
on empirical evidence from World Bank projects and assessments in Africa, Central Asia 
and elsewhere, this paper proposes a microeconomic quantitative description of logistics 
costs. The paper theoretically and empirically highlights that landlocked economies are 
primarily affected not only by a high cost of freight services, but also by the high degree 
of unpredictability in transportation time. The main sources of costs are not only physical 
constraints but widespread rent activities and severe flaws in the implementation of the 
transit systems, which prevent the emergence of reliable logistics services. The business 
and donor community should push towards implementation of comprehensive facilitation 
strategies, primarily at the national level, and the design of robust and resilient transport 
and transit regimes. A better understanding of the political economy of transit and a 
review of the implementation successes and failures in this area are needed. 
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Section 1  Introduction 
 
  
With current trends in reduction in maritime transport cost and more advanced logistics 
technology that compensates for the handicap of intercontinental distance, lack of direct 
sea-access presents growing challenges to the global integration and growth prospects of 
many landlocked developing countries (LLDCs). At present, about one out of five 
countries in the world is landlocked
2. The problem mostly affects the poorest countries: 
20 out of 54 low-income economies are landlocked, with a majority of them in Sub-
Saharan Africa, while only three high-income economies out of 35 are landlocked (not 
counting European micro-states and dependencies
3). 
 
The case of LLDCs has naturally received special attention, including a specific set of 
development priorities (as spelled out in the Almaty program, see next sections). The 
problem of being landlocked has been analyzed mostly at a macro-level with a focus on 
the dependence over transit countries and on LLDCs’ transport cost disadvantage. Hence, 
emphasis has traditionally been set on three kinds of measures: (1) transport 
infrastructure at the national level, (2) international laws and treaties, and (3) cross-border 
cooperation. 
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of current approaches, there is a strong case for a deeper 
analytical and micro-economic understanding of the transit systems serving LLDCs as 
well as many activities in coastal countries. Indeed, transit logistics is complex, involves 
many public and private participants and requires adequate procedures and 
responsibilities. Its performance is determined by a wide range of policies, 
implementation mechanisms, or organizations of services. This paper tries to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of how these factors translate into costs. It is rooted in the 
World Bank Group operational activities: country audits, partnership programs, corridor 
and trade facilitation projects, and use a substantial amount of data from these various 
sources.  
                                                 
2 43 out of 193 internationally recognized sovereign states. 
3 four landlocked countries are micro-states in Europe: Andorra, San Marino, Vatican, and Lichtenstein.   4
We question the notion that costs of transportation supported by developing countries are 
intrinsically high. Neither the distance covered, nor the unit cost of transportation 
services, are necessarily much higher in landlocked developing countries than in the 
wealthiest countries. Yet there are significant variations; for instance, Central and East 
Africa have higher unit costs than the EU but this is not the case of South and East Asia 
or other sub-regions in Africa. Unfortunately shippers also support a lot of non-essential 
overheads resulting from corruption, overregulation and private inefficiencies, the total of 
which may be very high. Furthermore, transportation costs only explain one part of the 
real impact of being landlocked. Delays and even more importantly low degree of 
reliability and predictability of services create massive disincentives to invest and higher 
total logistics costs. 
 
Much of the cost supported by LLDCs may not be exogenous, as primary sources of cost 
are associated with poor performance of transit logistics resulting from a combination of 
(i) bad design or implementation of transit regimes, and (ii) unfavorable political 
economy of transit and particularly its vulnerability to rent seeking activities. These may 
be as or even more important in constraining the trading prospects of many LLDCs than 
poor infrastructure or political disputes. 
 
Previous research is essentially based on macro-modeling and cannot identify the relative 
importance of possible sources of costs. In order to fill this gap, we propose to follow a 
supply chain model initially proposed by Baumol (1970). We use micro-level 
disaggregated data to identify the three components of transit costs: (i) transport costs, (ii) 
logistics costs and (iii) hedging costs incurred by shippers to cope with unpredictable 
delivery schedules. This paper identifies the various sources of logistics costs and 
provides examples worldwide. More detailed data (at shipment level) have been obtained 
from World Bank projects which we have contributed to appraise in East and Central 
Africa. 
 
Section 2 reviews the literature on the nexus between geographic location, trade and 
growth and the induced policy conclusions. Section 3 reviews the transit framework and   5
introduces the supply chain cost model. Sections 4 through 6 identify the dimensions of 
supply chain performance that determine total transit costs. Section 7 develops a 
quantitative model and proposes an application to the Northern Corridor, serving Uganda, 
Rwanda and Kenya from Mombasa in East Africa. The final section derives the policy 
implications. 
 
Section 2  A Literature Survey and Policy Recommendations  
 
Variants of the new economic geography, new trade theory, neoclassical and endogenous 
growth theories have been applied to highlight the nexus between geographic location, 
trade and economic growth.  Some of their conclusions are: (1) landlocked countries 
trade less vis-à-vis coastal countries
4 (on average 30% less than coastal countries),
5  (2) 
landlocked countries experience weaker growth than maritime countries
6 (being 
landlocked reduces average growth by about 1.5 percentage points)
7 and (3) on average 
landlocked countries had longer recourse to IMF than coastal countries. 
 
The impact of being landlocked is based on the idea of dependence over the transit state. 
It has produced two main corollaries: 
-  dependence necessarily implies high transaction costs, 
-  mitigating measures for landlocked countries result of two set of actions: first, 
adopting transit rules recognized by the international law, secondly, developing 
regional transport infrastructure.  
 
Dependence over the transit state necessarily implies high transaction costs (notably 
transportation costs). High transaction costs are perceived as the result of (i) “transit 
charges”
8 but also (ii) the difficulties to benefit from regional adequate infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
4 Irwin and Tervio (2002). 
5 Limao and Venables (2001). 
6 Bloom and Williamson (1997). 
7 MacKellar et al (2002). 
8 UNCTAD (2002) gives the example of port charges, road tolls, forwarding fees, customs bonds or 
transport quota restrictions. Further details and examples are given in section 4.    6
MacKellar et al. (2002) explain the negative relationship between landlockedness and 
growth using a neoclassical theory. They highlight that crossing a border implies higher 
transaction costs due to customs and handling costs. Therefore, landlockedness can be 
thought as raising import prices and reducing export revenues. It is one reason why 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) advocate the idea that a re-export model is extremely difficult 
to achieve in landlocked developing countries due to higher cost of intermediate 
products. Amjadi and Yeats (1995) point out that the incidence of transport costs fall 
heavily on the landlocked African countries since they have to adjust their selling price to 
world prices.    
 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) see two reasons why landlocked countries may be 
disadvantaged: 
-  coastal countries may have military or economic incentives to impose 
costs on landlocked countries. 
-  infrastructure development across national borders is more difficult to 
arrange than similar investments within a country, 
 
The specificity of landlocked countries has long been recognized by the international 
community. The current policy framework, summarized in The Almaty Programme of 
Action (Box 1), is aimed at tackling the issues of dependence and accessibility, targeting 
three priorities: (1) ensure the recognition of freedom of transit in international 
agreements, (2) develop transport infrastructure, and (3) encourage transnational 
cooperation. Early efforts involved legal measures. Many bilateral, regional and 
multilateral treaties have been signed since World War II, following the recognition of 
the right to freedom of transit for landlocked countries by the GATT Art V
9, and the 1958 
Geneva Convention on High Seas (further developed in the 1982 Montego Bay 
Convention). A recent World Bank review of legal instrument transit trade in Africa 
found that the main problem today is not the inadequacy or lack of agreements and 
frameworks (Table 1) but their poor implementation stemming from a lack of capacity or 
                                                 
9Article V of the GATT states that (1947) “there shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each 
contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the 
territory of other contracting parties.”   7
political will. Corridor management arrangements have been established to facilitate 
trade on several routes and have met some success (Arnold 2007) in solving some 
implementation issues and overcoming the natural reluctance of transit countries towards 
transit trade (Sachs, 2004). 
 
Box 1. The Almaty Programme of Action (2003) 
10 
The “Almaty Conference” (2003) highlighted five priority areas for landlocked countries. 
•  Transit Policy and Regulatory Frameworks: Both landlocked and transit countries 
should review their transport regulatory frameworks and establish regional transport corridors; 
•  Infrastructure Development: The need for the landlocked countries to develop multi-
modal networks (rail,  road, air, and pipeline infrastructure projects); 
•  Trade and Transport Facilitation: The need for the landlocked countries to implement 
the international conventions and instruments that facilitate transit trade (including the WTO); 
•  Development Assistance:  The need for the international community to assist by: (1) 
providing technical support, (2) encouraging foreign direct investment and (3) increasing official 
development assistance; and 
•  Implementation and Review: monitoring the implementation of transit instruments and 
conducting a comprehensive review of their implementation in due course. 
 
Source: Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries 
within a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and Transit 
Developing Countries (2003).    
 
 
Table 1.  The Number of Multilateral Legal Instruments with 
Relevance for Transit Trade in Africa 
 
Global Instruments  28 
Regional Instruments  8 
Sub-regional Instruments  90 
   Including:   
     Central Africa  16 
     Eastern Africa  12 
     Southern Africa  18 
     Western Africa  44 
Source de Matons (2004). 
 
Most existing action plans stress the need for new road construction to boost LLDCs’ 
trade. Current transit infrastructure presents severe problems that often require huge 
financial resources to maintain continuity of service such as maintaining the existing road 
                                                 
10 The International Ministerial Meeting of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and International 
Financial and Development Institutions on Transit Transport Cooperation .   8
networks and developing multimodal services. However, in many cases, delays and 
logistics costs are not primarily due to infrastructure problems.  
 
Section 3  The Need for a New Empirical and Conceptual Framework to Assess 
the Impact of Being Landlocked 
 
While there is a consensus on the problems of landlocked countries, the analysis so far 
has mainly focused on their transport cost disadvantage. Transport costs however account 
for only part of the real cost of being landlocked as they do not account for the transit 
delays and unpredictability which are critical in international trade.   
 
In the literature, macro-data are usually used to estimate the transportation costs burden. 
Using CIF/ FOB margin as a proxy for transport cost, Radelet and Sachs (1998) find 
these costs to be about 50% higher for landlocked countries.  Stone (2001) using the ratio 
of ‘freight payments as percent of total imports’ shows that landlocked developing 
countries, especially in Africa, bear exorbitant transport costs: out of 15 landlocked 
African countries, 13 had a ratio higher than 10% and for 7 the ratio was even higher at 
20% as compared with 4.7% for industrial countries and 2.2% for the US. 
 
These measurements not only have several shortcomings but also do not take into 
account the impact of transport and transit delays, which are critical for 
exporters/importers. We demonstrate in this paper that the gap between landlocked 
countries and gateway countries may not be very high – if transport cost is the only 
parameter taken into account. Shippers in most African gateway countries already face 
high logistics costs when adding maritime transport, port charges (which can be ten times 
higher in some African ports as compared to ports in developed countries), and domestic 
transport (especially to/from remote areas, as is the case for several export crops). In 
Africa, many shippers in LLDCs have the same charges to move goods from/to ports as 
shippers in the gateway country.    9
 
Box 2.  Shortcomings of Current Macro-Estimation of Transportation Costs 
 
Cif/fob margin masks compositional effect due to their high level of aggregation (Hummels 1999)   They 
are generally unreliable for most developing countries (For several former Soviet Union countries, the fob 
figure was higher than the cif figure).  The issue of inclusion or not of insurance payments in these 
estimates is not clear depending on the countries. The informal transport charges can be inaccurately 
reported or estimated. Finally, internal transport costs are sometimes not included in cif estimates by 
customs even though these costs can be significant.  Comparing cif/fob data with real shipping data, 
Hummels and Lugovskyy (2003) found negative transportation costs for almost 40% of the bilateral US 
imports.’ 
 
In the case of “freight payments as percent of total imports,” there are two major methodological problems 
as well as data collection problems:  The registry location of vehicles, and of firms alike, used in transport 
largely determines whether freight payments are considered as: service export, import or domestic service 
provision. Changes in registry or cross-border sale (or relocation of the HQ) of transport firms (especially 
"flagging out" of merchant ships and to a lesser extent, aircraft and trucks) can transform what was a 
domestic provision or export of transport services into an import of the same, even if the very same ships, 
aircraft, or trucks can continue to operate on the same routes under the same management. This can cause 
serious discrepancies between registered data and the real situation in many LLDCs. Even, in developed 
countries, the ownership restructuring in the transport and logistics industry makes the use of the Balance 
of Payments data almost impossible.  Like cif/fob margin, it is masking disaggregated trends in transport 
costs. Shifts in the trade composition or trade partners or increase or decrease of transport costs for any 
product are not measured with this aggregate data.  
 
Additionally, there are several data collection problems (as raised in Stone, 2001): 
- Customs cif  generally represents the burden of import costs up to the country's border.  
In practice, estimates in some cases include internal transport charges up to the  
destination city in the landlocked country. The true economic burden of freight costs on  
imports should indeed include these internal costs, but they are not necessarily included. 
 
- The insurance issue is not clearly addressed: cargo insurance is, in some cases, probably  
included with Freight, in others it may be separately covered in the Insurance (debit)  
item. 
 
- We do not know exactly if it includes the ‘full burden of informal transport charges at  
security checkpoints’ (Stone 2001). In theory it should be, but in practice it may be  
problematic. 
 
Source: Hummels (1999) exchanges with Prof. Hummels and Prof. Ojala. 
 
A recent innovative body of work combines shipping cost-time information with trade 
statistics and highlight the value of time as a trade cost (Hummels (2001) and Djankov 
(2006)). Although more insightful than pure macro-statistics, this approach does not 
disentangle the various sources of transit trade cost (see section 5.1). 
 
3.1  Transit Systems and the Supply Chain Conceptual Framework 
 
Transit trade describes the inland movement of goods under customs control that is not 
cleared by customs. Transit can take place in the country of destination/origin of the   10
goods (national transit) or in a third country where the merchandise is carried from an 
entry post to an exit post (international transit). Hence a complete transit operation is a 
sequence of international and national transit links (Figure 1). Landlocked countries can 
trade beyond their immediate neighbors only through transit systems. 
 




By nature, a transit operation is extended in time and space involving several countries 
and many private and public participants. Hence transit systems tend to be  complex and 
vulnerable to fragmentation and rent-seeking activities. Transit trade requires more 
oversight than intra-national trade over similar distances. This is because though a transit 
customs regime is eventually defined at a multi-country level, its implementation is at the 
national level. Such trade also depends on measures taken by countries to regulate vehicle 
movement, people (drivers), and trade in services and foreign investment. 
 
3.2  The Purpose of Transit Systems: A Delayed Customs Clearance 
 
Transit procedures seek to implement the freedom of transit (Article V of the GATT) 
while at the same time safeguarding the interest of the transit country from potential 
fiscal loss by ascertaining that goods in transit actually exit the country.  Any transit 
operation has three core principles: 
1.  The consignee or the designated agent (the principal) provides a guarantee 
through a financial institution to the transit country’s customs (bond) based on the 
value of applicable duties on transit goods to cover the risk of cargo 














International Transit National Transit 
Final 
Clearance   11
2.  Transport has to be in secured vessels and customs affix seals on the vessel (e.g. 
container) that is checked at the entry port. 
3.  Customs implement documentary and information systems at borders to reconcile 
inflows and outflows. 
For an effective transit regime, the physical movement of goods must be backed by 
relevant financial and documentary flows (Figure 2).  
 


























This process is repeated in every transit country.  In most cases, final clearance does not 
occur at the border, but may occur in a customs facility located either at the capital or in 
the main economic center. From a trade facilitation perspective, it is preferable to 
complete the final clearance close to the economic operator. In such case, international 
transit complements national transit from the border to the clearance facility. Transit may 
Customs:  
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also include multimodal transport operations, specific customs transit, and border/ control 
procedures en route. In the absence of a customs union, the same constraints apply to 
regional trade as well. 
 
In Western Europe, transit procedures were streamlined after WWII into the seamless 
Transport International Routier (TIR) system.
11 While setting transit procedures remains 
a national prerogative, the TIR introduced several new features for facilitating transit 
traffic through eliminating duplications. 
•  The concept of authorized operators whereby only qualified operators 
participate and self regulation is enforced by national associations; 
•  A single harmonized manifest (carnets TIR) that is issued in the country of 
origin and used at every border;  
•  A mutually recognized system of privately managed guarantees.  A guarantee 
taken with the carnet in the country of origin covers all transit bonds in the 
transit country due to a chain of mutually recognized insurance systems (like 
the mechanisms widely available for driver’s insurance); 
•  The integrity of TIR is guaranteed by the overseeing agency - the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the International 
Road Transport Union (IRU), which certifies the compliance of the national 
entity. Failure to properly implement the systems means suspension and 
inability of the national operators to benefit from the TIR. Russia came close 
to being excluded and had to take energetic measures against fraud in 2000. 
 
The following basic transit principles of customs procedures as applied in the TIR system 
can be traced to the Middle Ages in Europe, when the renaissance of intra-European trade 
had to overcome a high degree of territorial fragmentation. The principles proved robust 
and allowed for the implementation of freedom of transit. Transit works smoothly if its 
key features are not perverted. 
                                                 
11 The EU is implementing New Computerized Transit System (NCTS) for EU and EFTA countries.  This 
system borrows key features from the TIR.   13
1.  Transit is not primarily a chain of control. Freedom of transit depends on the 
guarantees provided by operators for covering the potential fiscal loss.  In fact, 
controls en route are redundant with guarantees. 
2.  Transit is a Public Private Partnership and requires consensus between public 
entities (customs, governments) and private operators (transporters, freight 
forwarders).  
3.  Transit is not a transnational procedure but a chain of (preferably) nationally 
harmonized procedures.  Transit is initiated and discharged by a customs agency 
within a customs territory. However, harmonizing documentation (such as TIR 
carnets) and cooperation between border agencies can smooth the process by 
avoiding duplications. 
4.  The principal of transit is generally the logistics operators organizing the full 
sequence of operations for the consignee/shipper. This activity requires a high 
level of professionalism and can be helped by affiliation to an international 
network (as it is difficult to implement a good transit systems on corridors where 
shippers operate on their own account or where the logistics chain is fragmented). 
5.  Customs need a sound information system to report the flow of transit vehicles, 
which contrary to common opinion does not need to be a real-time monitoring. 
 
3.3  The Real World: An Inefficient Chain of Multiple Clearances 
 
While port delays impact all countries, LLDCs face an added disadvantage linked to 
transit economics. This is due to the multiple lengthy clearance systems on most 
corridors.  
 
In East Africa, goods bound for landlocked countries face the time equivalent of at least 
three clearance processes, while coastal countries face only one: 
1.  In the port, goods dwell time often does not differ much between transit and 
domestic cargo (although domestic cargo is subject to the clearance process). In 
Tanzania, the Dar Es Salaam port shows slightly higher dwell time for goods 
bound to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, as compared to domestic goods since   14
2004 (over 25 days as compared to 20 )
12. This is also true for transit trade 
through Mombasa, Kenya.
13 
2.  The border(s) mean waiting time for further document reviews. On the Northern 
Corridor to Rwanda, it takes on average more than 24 hours to cross the Kenya- 
Uganda border.
14 
3.  The final goods clearance is completed in the capital city.
15  
Ultimately, transit goods will have gone through three to four clearance processes.  
 
Since most developing countries rely heavily on tariff duties, they tend to develop 
redundant procedures to avoid fiscal loss. The main bottleneck is the inadequacy of the 
applied transit regime, as it is conceived as a chain of control rather than the freedom of 
transit given to compliant operators in exchange of guarantees.   
 
The reasons for the supply chain fragmentation are: 
•  The initiation of transit, often as cumbersome a process as final clearance in the 
gateway country. 
•  Inadequate carnets and guarantee systems or bad implementation of good transit 
systems (TIR) (transit from Douala to Bangui needs seven documents, none of 
them being a proper transit manifest).   
•  Uniform implementation of transit controls, irrespective of the principal’s 
reliability and competence. 
•  Convoy or escort systems not only on risky cargo or insecure vessels (open 
trucks), but also on containers. 
•  Excessive controls en route, paving the way for additional illegal controls.  
•  Obsolete freight regulations (particularly in Africa). 
•  Regulatory barriers that impact the market structure and the quality of key support 
services (brokers, finance, insurance…) (Appendix 1 for more details). 
                                                 
12 TPA, brief on the Dar Es Salaam Port, June 2004. 
13 Kenya Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, 2005. 
14 NCTTCA Observatory survey, 2005, based on a sample of 200 trips by well known transporters. 
15 In Rwanda, 3-5 days ( DTIS Rwanda, report, 2005) and in Uganda, 3-4 days (authors interviews, 2004).   15
 
3.4  A Supply Chain Conceptual Framework 
 
Any transit system, and especially an inefficient one, impacts traders in landlocked 
countries much beyond the freight costs.  Operators need to hedge in view of the 
unreliable service delivery - either through increasing inventories or through switching 
towards alternative but more expensive transport modes.
16  In industrialized countries, 
supply chain management in the last three decades has led to innovative approaches in 
management or service delivery approaches that have resulted in reducing non-
transportation cost (inventories, administrative costs…).  In contrast, most LDCs have 
remained untouched by these changes.  Inventories are high, substantial freight overheads 
add to transportation costs, when they are a small percentage of transport costs in mature 
markets.  For example in Central African Republic, only 60% of the freight costs goes to 
the trucking service.   
 
Supply chain literature provides the conceptual framework to disentangle logistics costs 
deriving from the sequence of transit operations, and subsequently assess the impact of 
facilitation, regulatory or investment measures.  Expanding upon a model initially 
proposed by Baumol (Baumol 1970), we begin with a consignee or shipper in the 
landlocked country of destination/origin. This end user supports costs directly or through 
fees paid to agents providing services such as freight forwarders or transport operators. 
Figure 3 summarizes the operational chain of responsibilities and agencies in transit. 
Accordingly, the total logistics cost C supported by the shipper/consignee is broken down 







                                                 
16
 The reliability factor depends on the nature of the product.  Current indicators show high level of inventory holdings 
by retailers of consumer and manufactured goods in developing countries.    16





Table 2.  The Three Components of Total Logistics Costs 
C  =    (1) Transportation Costs  =  Fees paid for actual transit transportation
17 
services to truckers or rail operators 
    +  (2) Other Logistics Costs  =  (2a) transit overheads: fees, procedures, 
facilitation payments. 
       +  (2b) Fixed costs of shipments 
    +  (3) Delay Hedging Costs  = (3a) in transit moving inventory costs 
       + (3b) induced costs to hedge unreliability 
inventory and warehousing costs, or shift to 
faster more expensive mode of transportation 
 
 
Table 3 provides a snapshot of how the various transit performance bottlenecks 
mentioned in 3-1, 3-2, and Appendix 2, relate to the source of costs.  
                                                 
17 Transportation costs are transportation fees while logistics costs also include overheads and inventories 
costs. 




Transporter  Freight 
Forwarder 
Shipper or 
Consignee   17
 
Table 3.  Contribution of Selected Supply Chain Links to Cost Factors 
 Direct  Costs  Overheads  Delay Uncertainty  Comments 
Port Handling  high to very 
high 
  variable  variable  Typically higher in developing 











high high  to 
very high 
very high  Responsibilities difficult to 
disentangle from the many 
participants in the process, and 
total port dwell time and 









Cheaper, but less reliable than 
professional road service, though 








Multimodal operations have a 
potentially high impact on the 





























































































Trade-off between modern 
transport companies (which 
provide more reliable services 
but at a higher cost) and informal 
transporters and individuals 
(which provides cheaper 
services), but a lower reliability). 
In a regulated market, direct and 
overheads costs are much higher 




moderate moderate moderate  high   




low  Checkpoints and illegal activities 













average average  to 
high 
mandatory warehousing may add 
substantially to the overheads   18
 
 
Section 4  Revisiting the Conventional Wisdom on Transportation Costs 
 
We complemented previous macro-analyses on transportation cost cif/fob margins with 
data from exporters/importers and freight forwarders operating in LLDCs.
18  Road and 
rail are the main inland surface freight modes for LLDCs
19. Historically, rail played a 
crucial role in the early development of most LLDCs (the railways in Central Asia still 
do).  However, railways have ceded market shares to trucking during the last two decades 
due to their lower performance and reliability in most regions. Containerized traffic for 
high value goods is usually through trucks.  For most shippers, railway discounts 
(typically 30% or more in Africa and Central Asia) cannot compensate for the induced 
costs in terms of delays and reliability.  As road transport is dominant, we focus on road 
transport costs.  We use the traditional measure of transport costs by ton and by kilometer 
expressed in US cents.  
 
The long distance ton*km value is in the range of 4-6 US cents in industrial economies, 
but varies more than tenfold among corridors serving LLDCs: 
•  As low as 1.5-2 US cents in Western Asia (Iran, Pakistan). 
•  As high as 20 cents of Euros in Chad, barely below current air cargo rates 
on some long distance routes between developed markets. 
 
Due to the trade imbalance, (imports usually exceed exports in developing countries) 
exporters usually get a discount on outbound road transport.  Although freight rates are 
                                                 
18  Collecting transport costs as part of field work can be confusing. Depending on the source or the 
commodity, there may be variations of transport tariffs for four reasons.  (1) Perimeter of services: 
depending on their responsibility in the logistic chain, operators include certain costs Typically, freight 
forwarders who organize the transit trade for the shipper/consignee, charge the latter with not only the 
transport service cost billed by the truck or rail companies, but also the fixed costs of organizing and 
administering the transit shipment. (2) Commercial discounts: given to high volumes/preferred customers. 
(3) Commodity and resulting service quality, and (4) Illegal payments for facilitating the process and these 
are usually not acknowledged in surveys or interviews. 
19 Multimodal barges or ferry systems do play a role inter alia in the case of the Parana River (Paraguay), 
Congo River, and also on the Caspian Sea.   19
influenced by many factors, operating constraints, market structure, and regulations are 
critical elements. One of the most important parameters is the load factor, since:  
 trip) a on    load   nominal   of   %   (average Factor    Load
(cents/km) Truck     the of Cost    Operating
 x
(tons)   Load   Nominal
1
  km) Rate(/ton/ =
 
A large trade imbalance brings the import freight rate up to a factor two compared to the 
rate implied by a balance trade. Conversely trucks overloading increases the load factor 
and reduces rates, however, it increases the negative externalities of transport. 
 
4.1  Operating Costs 
 
The equation 1 for freight rate shows that the operating costs, and its structure (box 3) are 
key to understand the magnitude of transportation cost and the non-trivial factors that 




Though operating parameters are not homogeneous among operators (as in EU and US), 
haulers in LLDCs in general have high variable costs, low fixed costs and a low 
utilization ratio. In principle, if there are no artificial restrictions to truck utilization, the 
lower fixed costs in developing countries should compensate for the higher variable 
costs, with operating costs is in the same range as in developed countries, e.g. $0.8 per 
Box 3.  Breakdown of Vehicle Operating Costs 
Transport companies analyze their cost structure in two categories: 
1. Fixed Costs  =  Pro rata temporis independently of vehicle usage 
  =  Financial charges, depreciation of investment, wages, facilities, taxes 
(including vehicle taxes), and margin 
    
2. Variable Costs  =  Proportional to vehicle usage (distance or trips) 
  =  Fuel, subsistance, road user charges 
Maintenance, tires, taxes 
Hence, 
Costs   Variable
Month per    Distance
Cost Monthly    Fixed km per  Cost    Operating + =  
The usual benchmark for operating cost (widely used in international comparisons) is the cost of 
traction per km for a 40’ container or a semi-trailer.    20
km in the US and €1 in EU (for long distance services. The table below provides a 
comparison of operating costs for organized trucking.
20 
 
Table 4.   Comparison of Truck Operating Costs in Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and in Africa 
 





Europe (France)  € 340  € 0.25 
€0.35 (toll 
roads) 
10,000 or more 
Transit South-East Europe  € 250   €0.3  >10,000 
 
Organized Companies in African 
LLDCs (2005) 
$ 90-150   $0.5-$0.8  4,000-8,000 
Source: CNTR June 2006 statistics (France), Authors’interviews (Africa) and  TTFSE 
project. 
 
In one of the World’s least friendly corridors, Douala-Bangui in Central Africa, where 
the road is not paved on long sections, the observed traction cost (€1.25) is only 25-50% 
higher than in EU or the US. The fivefold difference in rate between Douala-Bangui and 
LA-Chicago (for a distance twice shorter) is mainly due to the load factor differences and 
the high level of overheads on the corridor. 
 
Table 5.  Comparison of the Estimated Structure of Logistics Costs 
 
 Douala/Bangui L.A./Chicago 
Operating Cost per Kilometer  1.25 0.85 
Distance 1,450 3,000 
Load Factor  0.5 0.87 
Transportation Cost (net)  3,625 2,931 
Overheads  66% 5% 
Total Logistics Costs  6,017 3,077 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
Fixed costs are lower in developing countries because: 
                                                 
20 Cost structure in developing countries deserves a more systematic research, especially to extend the 
knowledge beyond the case of medium-large companies, easy to assess. No comprehensive review has 
been carried out since the Western Africa/South Asia comparison by Rizet et al (1992).   21
•  Labor costs are a small percentage (5% or less) of total operating costs,  and  
constitute half of the operating costs in Western Europe; 
•  Investment costs are much lower. Even the more structured companies in 
LLDCs typically buy second hand trucks in Europe at the end of the initial 
three year leasing period (250,000-300,000 km) and use them for three to six 
years. Furthermore many trucks operated by individual owners are even much 
older (10-15 years). 
Higher variable cost reflects: 
•  High fuel consumption stemming from usage, age, and vehicle fleet condition 
(50 liters per 100 km in some conditions); 
•  High maintenance costs (due to vehicle age, road conditions, and 
overloading). Tire usage is, on many corridors, 2 or 3 higher than in EU; 
•  Truckers’ behavior and professional ethics. 
 
A low quality of the infrastructure directly increases variable costs, since bad roads mean 
more fuel consumption and maintenance needs. 
 
Truck utilization is highly variable and linked to the market structure: 
•  Organized companies in Southern Africa optimize their usage and have the 
same usage as European haulers (10,000 km per month); 
•  Oversupply is common on many corridors (Western, Central Africa and 
Tanzania), with many individual waiting for days to get cargo. The usage can 
be reduced to be as low as 3,000 to 4,000 km per month. Organized truckers 
tend to allocate older trucks on routes where there are usage limitations 
(waiting time at ports or borders for instance); 
•  Average fleet age, road quality and overloading increase immobilization time 
due to frequent vehicle breakdowns; and 
•  Low usage can be also encouraged by excessive regulation of freight 
allocation such as compulsory “tour de role.” 
   22
4.2  Trucking Market Regulation and Structure 
 
In many trade corridors, market organization and formal or informal systems of freight 
allocation raise transport prices. This situation happens when a cartel or syndicate 
controls freight allocation in the transit logistics business and there is a mandatory or de 
facto queuing system (“tour de role”). In many Western African corridors, bilateral 
treaties define the transport share of both countries (generally 50/50 or a higher share for 
the landlocked country’s operators), and define the freight allocation procedure. 
 
Such system maintains an excess freight capacity of demand. It allows a large number of 
operators to specialize in transit trade, agreed by the regulator (syndicate, freight bureau). 
They provide services with limited commercial concerns (such as performance and 
quality). Since shippers and forwarders are price-takers, the regulator adjusts the price up 
so that the fixed cost is recovered irrespective of the number of kilometers run per month. 
The authors found (2006) that on the Chadian corridor freight bureau’s intervention 
double transport prices. This is rather similar to monopolistic taxi organizations at major 
airports, which tend to drive the price up as compared as competitive rates in the same 
metropolitan areas. 
 
Breaking traditional tour de role or cartel/cargo repartition systems can significantly 
lower transport prices. Opening the Laos transit trade to all Thai truckers in 2004 reduced 
the logistics costs from Bangkok to Vientiane by 30%.
21  Deregulation also creates 
opportunities for improving the quality of service delivery and for investing in better 
equipment, since the shipper can reclaim market power over the regulator. The following 
simulation in (Figure 4) illustrates the nexus between regulation and prices, based on data 
typical of an African corridor. It shows the price impact of the transition between the 
regulated corridor market characterized by an artificial excess supply of trucks (and low 
utilization) over the demand for transit freight and in a competitive outcome where transit 
and national markets are integrated. The graph also illustrates the consequence of 
facilitation measures, designed to decrease transit time and increase utilization. Such 
                                                 
21 Arnold (2005).   23
measures decrease the price in a competitive market but have potentially no impact in the 
oversupplied regulated market since there is no change in the monthly utilization of truck. 
 
Figure 4.  Trucking Price and Trucking Market Structure
22 
 















Source: Authors’ Calculations. 
 
Section 5  Managing the Risk of Supply Chain Unreliability Risk: Delays and 
Unpredictability and Their Impact on Economic Operators 
 
Since moving goods through borders takes a longer time than the time warranted by the 
infrastructure, vehicle, or physical constraints, managing this risk either through 
increased inventory holdings or alternative modal choices adds to the already substantial 
logistics costs in developing countries. Anecdotal evidence indicates that in many 
LLDCs, the formal operators (such as supermarkets) maintain high inventories (three 
months or more is frequent in landlocked countries) as compared with their peers in 
advanced countries.
23  
                                                 
22 Formula (2) is used with the following parameters: Potential truck use of 6,000 km and 9,000 km with  
corridor improvement (b) Fixed costs of 4,000 USD per month and variable costs of 0.6 USD per km. 
23 Guasch 2005.   24
 
Aggregating the total logistics costs (transport, overheads and inventories), Bowersox 
(2005) and Ojala (2005) show that a logistics gap is widening between industrialized and 
developing countries. While the logistics costs as a % of GDP has fallen from 15 to 20 % 
of GDP in the early 80s to less than 10% of GDP in industrialized countries due to better 
supply chain management and reduced inventory holdings. In LDCs, logistics costs as a 
share of GDP can be over 30% (the figures for emerging economies is 15 to 20% of 
GDP).  
 
The cost of hedging unreliability depends on several factors such as the time value 
attached to the cargo, the lead-time in transit, its variability, and the cost for the operator 
of a break in the supply chain (cost of a stockout or of setting up alternative logistics). 
Typically, this cost can be expressed as equivalent days of inventory. 
 
5.1  Assessing the Value of Time 
 
In the context of a supply chain model, the value of time is an operational concept: the 
cost of ownership of the goods in inventory There are essentially two types of 
inventories: (1) inventory in motion for goods in transit and (2) inventory in owners’ 
warehouse before processing, distribution, or expedition. In both cases, the costs include 
financial charges, obsolescence, and loss of damaged or stolen goods. Inventory costs 
also include the fixed costs of warehousing at destination.  Moving inventory costs also 
include the cost of vessels (container rental, deposit costs or demurrage charges, terminal 
and storage facilities). These charges do not evolve exactly pro rata temporis, but may 
increase with time, especially for demurrage fees.
24. The estimates provided in Arnold 
(2006) and which the authors confirm are:
25 
•  The value of containerized manufactured goods in low and middle income 
countries range between 2,000-5,000 USD per ton (20,000-50,000 per TEU). 
                                                 
24 However, while shipping line tariffs are designed to encourage container rotations, they give a more 
favorable treatment to containers in transit. 
25 In the model in the following sections, we use the case of a shipment of 50,000 USD, a value of time of 
50 USD a day for a 40’.   25
•  The value of time is put conservatively at 20-30 USD per TEU (40-60 USD 
per trailer or 40’) or 0.1 % of value per day
26. 
 
The operational concept differs from value of time proposed by trade economists (see 
Section 3). The later implements Samuelson’s iceberg principle and looks at the overall 
impact of time on trade flow, rather than on logistics costs. Hence, this economic value of 
time includes, depending on the model, not only the value pro rata temporis of goods, but 
eventually the cost of transportation and opportunity costs due to the “time barrier”. 
Unsurprisingly, economic value is much in excess of the operational concept. Hummels 
(2001) found that the former much depends upon the product, but that on average one 
more day in transit is valued at 0.8% of the value of goods. Notwithstanding its high 
relevance for trade economics, the economic value of time can not be used in micro-
economic modeling of the supply chain, since it already incorporates overall effects
 27. 
 
A third concept of the value of time is the revealed preference for a modal choice 
between transport modes. This estimate is possible in Central Asia and Caucasus where 
both rail and road modes are available. Our estimate (Appendix 4) shows that shippers 
are ready to pay 370 USD for a 40’ to gain one day by shifting from rail to road. Again 
this estimation is much higher than the operational value of time. A plausible 
explanation, developed below in this section, is that the modal choice preference is also a 
choice of reliability and flexibility. 
 
5.2  Magnitude and Sources of Delays 
 
Given their existing infrastructure and transport services, LLDCs are not far from their 
main markets or from a gateway port. Port gateways for economic centers in Africa 
should be linked in less than a week. Even in the most difficult Central Africa corridor 
                                                 
26 A typical interest rate of 15% (for Africa) already contributes to a value of time of 0.04 % a day. 
 
27  As a result, the economic value of time cannot be used in micro-economic supply-chain models. Its use 
in appraising trade facilitation projects may overestimate the benefits of average delay reduction from 
investment or process improvement.   26
sections, trucks can cover at least 300 km a day - including rest stops and checkpoints 
(See Appendix 1).  
 
While export transit time is, usually
28, not much above this “infrastructure” time baseline, 
e.g. one to two weeks, lead time for imports is higher, and often much more than that,: 
•  Highest lead times are in Central Africa (up to 4-6 weeks or more on the 
import leg), with marginally better performance in East Africa. 
•  In Western Africa, average lead time is low. On average, ship arrival-to 
clearance time in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) is 10 days, which is better 
than clearance time in many advanced countries. This is due in part to the 
competition between ports on the Gulf of Guinea to capture transit trade in 
ports. 
 
Yet even in the most favorable situations, lead time is much greater than necessary.  On 
most journeys, shipments spend time waiting for processing due to the multiple 
clearances in transit logistics (see Section 3). 
•  The most important source of delay is initiating transit
29 in ports, which 
typically takes as much time as final clearance. 
•  The second source is final clearance at destination. 
•  Border delays are also a concern, particularly in major regional border-
crossings
30. In Southern Africa, border delays between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (Beit Bridge) reached six days in 2003 and In Central Asia, trucks 
can face a delay of three days at the Uzbek border. Delay are due to (1) 
Congestion created by haulers schedule and inadequate and uncoordinated 
working hours (2) Slow processing and duplication of tasks. 
•  Other sources include (1) Mandatory freight procedures; (2) Controls en 
route, including axle-load control (trucks can wait for hours at a weighbridge 
                                                 
28 There are exceptions such as export trade from Central Asia mainly due to political disputes. 
29 Transit initiation and final clearance immobilize scarcely the vehicle. Hence, the potential of time saving 
for vehicles is lower than total time savings potential. 
30 Arvis (2004) estimates that the total cost of crossing a border in Africa is the same as the cost of inland 
transport over 1,000 miles (1,600 km) or the cost of 7,000 miles of sea transport (11,000 km). In contrast, 
the cost of border crossing in Western Europe is equivalent to only 100 miles of inland transportation.   27
on the Northern corridor between Mombasa and Nairobi); (3) Infrastructure 
condition; (4) Trans-shipment at multimodal facilities or at the border when 
trucks cannot go through and the merchandise needs to be unloaded to a 
vehicle of another nationality (common in Asia) and (5) Customs convoy 
requirements which besides slowing traffic can entail wasting days in transit, 
if convoys are not available daily. 
 
The fact that virtually on every corridor in LDCs, initiation of transit takes as much time, 
as final clearance is potentially the single biggest anomaly in the current implementation 
of transit regimes. Transit initiation requires a simplified documentation (manifest) as 
compared with final clearance. For most shipments, the process should not include 
inspection or intervention of non-customs agencies. Finally, the Principal of transit is 
very often a large international forwarder, which can provide customs with appropriate 
guarantees. Unfortunately: 
•  Many gateway countries consider transit operations as a minor element of 
well conceived customs reform programs
31; 
•  Inadequacy of documents (In a recent mission to the Douala Bangui corridor 
we found seven transit documents, distributed by three different groups of 
agencies, none of them being an adequate transit manifest); and 
•  Risk management is absent: there is no incentive for compliant and reputable 
logistics operators. 
 
5.3  The Observed Unpredictability of Lead Time 
 
Direct empirical evidence on the distribution curve of lead time over a full transit process 
is far from systematic. It is more easily available for partial transit processes (such as 
border-crossing or dwell time at container terminals in ports).  As part of the preparation 
of the East Africa trade and Transport facilitation project, the authors were able to get 
extensive transit lead time data from one logistics operator on the Northern Corridor  
                                                 
31 In many coastal countries, transit import is a very small fraction of domestic traffic (often less than 10% 
in value).   28
These data include the breakdown of various phases in transit but not data of individual 
shipments. The lead time probability distribution function (p.d.f.) is asymmetric with a 
broad tail, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 6 below. 
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Table 6.  Various Transport Times in Mombasa Port and on Transit  
Between Kenya and Uganda (2005) 
 
 Mode  Median Mean  95
th Percentile 
Port Dwell Time in Mombasa  4.5 days 8 days  13 days 27 days 
Transit Through Kenya and Uganda 3.5 days 4 days  5 days  10 days 
Source: Authors’surveys. 
 
In East Africa, along the Central corridor from Dar-es-Salaam to Kampala, transit time  
usually reaches eight days, which imply a return trip of less than twenty days.  However, 
according to some freight operators the return trip may take up to 45 days (20 days to go, 
5 days for clearance, and 20 days to return) (Figure 6 for distribution of transit time 
between Mombasa and Kampala). Similarly, bringing goods from Douala to Chad can   29
take between 1 and 5 weeks. Along the Northern Corridor, depending on the departure 
date from Mombasa and the size of the convoy, difference in transit time can be of more 
than 3 days to reach the Ugandan border.  
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Data on border-crossing delays from other corridors in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America show that the dispersion of lead time is a universal phenomenon (Appendix 3 
and 4).  The stylized facts are: 
•  The lead-time is an asymmetric broad tailed distribution, which for practical 
purposes can be described by a log-normal distribution for lead time in excess 
of a baseline representing the minimum feasible time of transit considering 
current infrastructure, procedures, and services; 
•  The coefficient of variation for the excess over baseline lead time is from 0.5 
to 1.5; and 
•  The shape of the curve allows for the not so rare occurrence of lead time 
largely in excess of the median or even the mean. 
The broad tail paradigm is the reason why uncertainty has a huge impact on costs. 
 
Appendix 4 proposes a quantitative analysis based on the log-normal distribution, which 
will be used in applications.    30
 
5.4  Impact of Low Reliability of Logistics on Firms Competitiveness 
 
Inventories and Hedging Costs 
A fragmented transit chain and variance in processing time not only causes delays but 
also causes uncertainty and unpredictability. This increases the logistics cost for 
economic operators who are willing to pay premium for reliable logistics solution or need 
to maintain high inventories  
 
For maritime transport, a standard deviation of 20% of transport time increases transport 
costs by nearly 45% (Frankel 1999). Although difficult to quantify, the non-transport 
costs may be even more for shippers. Dobberstein et al. (2005) show that in Asian 
emerging markets, non transport-related logistics costs were 10% of the GDP and this 
was almost equal to the extent of transport costs in total logistics costs. Allen et al. (1985) 
demonstrate that increasing transit time and variance in transit time causes higher 
inventories and ultimately higher logistics costs.
32 Due to uncertainty, companies need to 
maintain high safety stocks in order to avoid any shortage of raw materials or 
intermediate products.  Spoornet,
33 the main railway company in Southern Africa, 
undertook a customer survey to assess its customer concerns. Reliability was considered 
as the prime concern before predictability, whereas time and speed were ranked 
respectively 7
th and 8
th in this list. In the textile industry, product quality, reliability and 
time to supply goods from developing countries to Europe or the US are as important as 
the price.  
 
Fafchamps et al. (2000)
34 also demonstrate that the incidence of delayed deliveries has a 
strong positive effect on inventory holdings.  Based on a sample of firms, the authors find 
that Zimbabwean firms hedge delivery risk by building input inventories.  In developing 
                                                 
32 Baumol (1970) in his model had already raised this issue of the impact of uncertainty on inventories. 
Consequently, exporter/importer wishes to pay more or may wait for one or two additional days in transit to 
have more reliable deliveries. See futher sections for the application of the model. 
33 Interview with B. Le Roux on March, 6
th 2004, former CEO of Spoornet. 
34 Fafchamps, M., Gunning, J.W., and Oostendorp, R. (2000), “Inventories and Risk in Manufacturing,” 
The Economic Journal, Number 110, pp.861-893.   31
countries, safety stocks due to uncertain transport delivery can even reach one year of 
expected sales
35. For two branches of auto-parts supplier of the same automobile maker, 
while the inventory level reached 7 days for the branch located in Italy, inventory level 
was 35 days for the branch located in Morocco. 
 
Another way of managing risk is through altering modal choice. Arnold (2007) found that 
garment producers in Bangladesh shipped up to 10% of their production by air to meet 
delivery schedule. 
 
The Case of the LLDCs 
In small developing country markets, supply chain management faces: 
•  Unpredictable supply chain due to uncertainty in shipment delivery time. 
•  Low level of demand, whether predictable or stochastic. For the same industry 
the volumes are typically lower in a landlocked country vis-à-vis a gateway 
country, leading to larger inventory costs as compared to its turnover; and 
•  Poor private sector capacities. 
 
Exports, Imports, Linkages, and Asymmetries 
In LLDCs, inventory management is not advanced.  Time is often not perceived as 
sensitive and sales upon goods arrival are still dominant in many places.  Yet, even in 
cases where the value of time is not internalized by the trader nor passed to the consumer, 
a theoretical approach of inventory cost may be applied to assess the opportunity cost to 
the economy, especially for imports of manufactured or intermediate goods.  The model 
is particularly relevant for exports since transformation activities are directly affected by 
the backward linkages in the supply chain (inputs), and there may be a high penalty for 
producers in LDCs due to the current level of uncertainty on imported inputs, for 
example: 
•  Exports of processed manufactured goods:  for these goods, the threshold of 
supply chain failure is lower than for imports. The cost of failure may be high 
                                                 
35 Despite difficulties to access data, Guasch and Kogan (2001) estimate the cost of additional inventory 
holdings to 2% of GDP for developing countries.   32
either in terms of loss of contract or in terms of switch towards an alternative 
but expensive transport mode (air cargo); and 
•  Time sensitive perishable exports (horticultural products): the cost of failure is 
also high (lost cargo) but may not be explicitly hedged.
36  
In both cases, the expected level of reliability is very high and can be measured by the 
acceptable level of failure. Classical inventory theory allows equivalence between non-
delivery and a measure in terms of inventory level (number of days) and hence a 
percentage of the value. Exporters/importers based in landlocked countries experience 
excessive obstacles to allow them to be fully integrated into the global supply chains. 
 
In the case of non time-sensitive commodity exports, the issue of reliability is less 
stringent and quality of service delivery is less critical. Usually logistics involved 
constitute a seasonal push towards the gateway ports.  For example, cotton in West Africa 
is shipped during the season to public warehouses in coastal countries and shipped on 
demand. However even in such cases, reliability concerns may exist.  Tea exporters from 
Malawi prefer to go through Durban rather than through the much closer Mozambican 
ports. 
 
Section 6  Non-transportation Costs: Rents and Market Failures 
 
Ordering and processing shipments imply a series of overhead expenses, which fall into 
two categories: 
1.  Transit overheads attached to transit and added to transport fees: These include 
procedural fees, illegal facilitation, mandatory private or public services 
associated with transit. The shipper may internalize the overheads but, in practice, 
fees are paid to other parties either directly or through agents (e.g. freight 
forwarders) who will charge an additional fee for processing; and 
2.  Administrative costs for shipments.
37  These are the fixed costs that the shipper 
has to take into account to make the logistics possible. 
                                                 
36 For example current transit bottlenecks in Uzbekistan, limit the potential of fresh products exports from 
Kyrgyz and Tajik Republics.   33
 
The first category pertains to procedures and regulations while the second reflects quality 
and affordability of key services. However there are deep systemic linkages between the 
two as well as with the overall political economy of transit. Since transit is extended in 
space and time and often takes place in countries with poor governance and business 
practices, it is especially vulnerable to rent-seeking activities.  Countries become trapped 
in vicious circles, where inefficient regimes sustain low service quality (e.g. transport, 
customs broking), or even informal activities which in turn perpetuate unfriendly regimes 
(Figure 7). Transport is trapped in equilibrium, where a transit system is optimized for a 
certain type of traders and service operators, and cannot evolve towards a system 
compatible with the requirements of global logistics networks, which could link the 
country to international markets. 
 
Figure 7.  The Vulnerability of the Supply Chain to Rent Seeking Activities 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 Unlike the transit overheads, administrative costs stem from purely private transactions and happen 
irrespective of the landlocked status of destination or origin. However, they are potentially much higher in 
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6.1  Transit Is Extremely Vulnerable to Rent-Seeking Activities 
 
The Link between Transit and Overheads
38 
Several overheads are associated with transit processes such as bonds. However, other 
overheads are not transit overheads since they apply to both transit and domestic trade 
such as port charges.  Finally, some costs do exist in both cases, but are substantially 
higher in the case of transit trade and hence contribute to overheads such as agents’ fees. 
 
The main categories of logistics overheads related to transit operations are the following: 
Corruption and “Facilitation” Payments en Route or at Origin and Destination 
A well-known and documented
39 phenomenon is the multiplication of facilitation 
payments at scheduled/unscheduled roadblocks. This is serious on some corridors (for 
instance, roadblock in West Africa add 10% to overheads and these roadblocks may 
occur every 30 kilometers, or even shorter distances).  These are usually small and 
predictable payments made to local police, military, or customs agents.  Transit initiation, 
or border crossing, carry the potential of much bigger payments between transit 
operators, customs and/or transport parastatals staff.  
 
Corruption may be severe at border crossings. In Central Asia, Megoran et al. (2005)
 
show that above the official mandatory costs for a Kyrgyz truck transiting through 
Uzbekistani territory, around 450 USD
40, there are the unofficial costs to be paid for 
speeding up the process.  These can range between 150-200 USD for a single truck.  In 
total, a Kyrgyz truck entering Uzbekistan has to pay approximately 700 USD to cross the 
border, a quarter of which are unofficial costs.   Weighbridges may also be a source of 
                                                 
38 Since transit overheads are the most important in terms of delays and unpredictability, we focus on 
transit-related overheads in this section. However, terminal and handling charges, excluding port charges, 
may be considered as overheads and similarly compulsory change of vehicles (for example from India to 
Bangladesh (Petrapole/Benapole)) or compulsory warehousing is common in Africa and in Chamber of 
Commerce owned facilities. 
39 Including in Western Africa, where with World Bank assistance ECOWAS created an observatory of 
those practices. 
40 The breakdown in 2004 was the following: USD 300 for a transit charge, USD 75 for insurance, USD 60 
for sanitary control, USD 10 for a visa, road user and escort fee charges, and an environmental tax (Data 
provided by the Osh Chamber of Commerce).   35
delays and illegal costs when they are not properly managed. Along the Northern 
Corridor, trucks can wait a day at the first weighbridge after Mombasa and truckers often 
bribe the weighbridge operators to go through it. 
 
Mandatory Transit-Related Procedures  
These include bonds or guarantees, compulsory transport of customs documents, escorts, 
transit fees and compulsory insurances.   Many transit related mandatory fees are 
overpriced and, in some cases unjustified and akin to rents (for instance, the various 
documents issued by freight organizations, transit documents of the Chambers of 
Commerce and compulsory insurance schemes).  Some additional services in the public 
administration in landlocked countries may also add to costs. In Rwanda, Magasins 
Généraux du Rwanda had, until 2006, a monopoly for warehousing and added between 
three to five days to the clearance process, while collecting 4% of the goods value as a 
fee (3% directly in favor of the government’s budget, 1% as a cost recovery fee). 
 
Agency Costs (freight forwarders) 
Transit logistics for many landlocked countries also tend to increase the rate charged by 
freight forwarders. In some cases in Central Africa, these rates may add 30% in 
overheads. The procedural complexity and multi-step processes imply that each shipment 
requires attention, staff, and costly intervention otherwise unnecessary in a seamless 
transit environment. Fixed operational cost (office and staff, including expatriate) become 
very significant on corridors where the number of shipment is low. On some corridors, 
weak competition means higher margin for high quality services. 
 
Magnitude of Transit Overheads for LLDCs 
Overhead is seldom disentangled from transportation costs. So far, only facilitation 
payments at roadblocks have received attention from policy makers and trade facilitation 
advocates. The reason for the knowledge gap is the limited incentives for agencies and 
operators to be transparent in their cost breakdown.  Even World Bank trade facilitation 
audits have not so far provided consistent information in that respect.  While rent seeking 
mentality and facilitation payments are common in all regions, the degree of proliferation   36
varies among corridors: in Western and Central Africa, rent seeking activities has been 
more prevalent than in other sub-regions.  Table 7 provides a simulation of the 
breakdown for the Lomé Corridor.  Less is known in other sub-regions; however, it 
seems quite likely that transit overheads are in the range of 30% to 100% of 
transportation costs, while they should probably be in the range of 5% to 20%
41. 
                                                 
41 The DOT in the USA estimates them at 4%.   37
 
Table 7  Simulation of Transit Overheads from Lomé (Togo) to 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 
 
Reference a 30 MFCFA 40’ container, January 
2006.  Value FCFA % transportation
Baseline transportation fees  1,100,000 100%
Facilitation payment at road blocks  100,000 9%
Other facilitation payments for transit 
(estimated)  200,000 18%
Official transit fees in Togo  111,000 10%
Freight bureau  10,000 1%
Transit Terminal (Chamber of Commerce)  10,000 1%
Convoy fees (customs)  10,000 1%
Shippers 'council waybill  10,000 1%
Transit Carnet Togo (Chamber of Commerce)  6,000 1%
Transit Bond in Togo (0.25%)  75,000 7%
Official transit fees in Burkina Faso  119,000 11%
Transit Carnet Burkina (Chamber of Commerce)  6,000 1%
Transit Bond in Burkina  75,000 7%
Shippers'  council waybill  2,500 0%
customs IT fee at border  5,000 0%
Convoy fees (customs)  5,000 0%
Warehousing fee in Ouagadougou (Chamber of 
Commerce)  31,500 3%
Freight forwarder's fees, including: 170,000 15%
Togo (initiation of transit)  75,000 7%
Border 20,000 2%
Ouagadougou (termination of transit)  75,000 7%
Mandatory insurance on transit goods (min 
0.3%)  90,000 8%
    
Total transit logistics overheads  790,000 72%
Facilitating payments  300,000 27%
Avoidable public procedures.  156,250 14%
Avoidable private services  175,000 16%
Total avoidable costs  631,250 57%
Total non-avoidable costs (bonds, forwarders fess 
at half current level)  158,750 14%
(Unit CFA Francs 1 Euro= 655.957 FCFA) 
Source: Authors’ Calculations. The simulation excludes the cost of final clearance   38
 
Quality Issues of Clearing Agents 
In some cases, the freight forwarders’ behaviors also distort transit efficiency. In several 
countries, access to the Clearing and Forwarding (C&F) business is not difficult.  One 
consequence of this easy access is “suitcase” companies with low capacity, low training, 
and low professionalism. These may bribe officials to stay afloat instead of following 
procedures properly. In this case, customs clearance, dwell time and uncertainty increase 
significantly and the responsibility for low performance is not due to public parastatals. 
Small traders are harmed because they are less likely to use large and expensive C&F 
agents. Statistical evidence from Cameroon suggest that more than 50% of dwell time in 
the Port of Douala is caused by the C&F low capacity to properly fulfill documentary 
requirements or inability to provide the necessary payments or securities
42. When the 
Cameroon Facilitation Committee tried to set quality criteria for clearing agents in 2005, 
less than 10% managed to fulfill them even after one year. In Kazakhstan, small size 
operators are specialized according to the types of commodities. Competition between 
freight forwarders does not exist in practice, with predetermined market shares.  
 
Low Quality of Some Transport Operators 
Quality of service providers and mismanagement of fleet is a key factor of uncertainty for 
traders to/from landlocked countries. Tanzania Railways Corporation has an error margin 
of 4 to 5 days to predict the arrival of any shipment due to locomotive shortages and 
wagon mismanagement.  As a result, although the rail mode is cheaper, road transit 
traffic to Northern Tanzania from Kenya has increased by more than 20% per year in the 
last five years.
43  It also explains why today more than three quarters of the Rwandan 
trade is through Kenya, while three years before over 50% was through Tanzania.  
                                                 
42 Cameroon Guichet Unique du Commerce Extérieur, 2004. 
43Source from NCTTCA, 2005 and the Tanzania DTIS Study, Transport report, 2004.   39
 
6.2  Who Is to Blame? Process and User Disconnect: Shipper’s Responsibility 
and the Impact on Lead Time 
 
From a policy perspective, a key question is whether the consignee (or the shipper) is 
responsible for the high lead time.  In many countries, small-scale traders often wait to 
start to clear the imported goods until they have been pre-sold, thereby using the port as a 
free or cheap storage. Changes in demurrage charges by terminal operators have 
sometimes dramatically eliminated dwell time. However, such strategy, which makes 
sense for a small trader in a crowded port city, is likely to be suboptimal for a consignee 
located days away from the port and with less space constraints. Furthermore, the nature 
of transit systems in LLDCs makes the process in the end very independent from the 
shipper or consignee: 
•  The latter has to rely on few agents and for containerized shipment on 
international forwarders with consistent quality of service. Some “suitcase 
operators,” who are part of the problem when involve in the clearance 
processes, do not have the capacity to organize transit. 
•  The procedures (and especially additional control procedures) are non-
selective and essentially independent of the nature of the shipment. 
•  The reasons for the delays at various phases in transit are essentially in the 
end irrespective of the shipper/consignee. 
 
Disconnect between process and users is less frequent in more advanced and friendly 
transit regimes which rely on incentives on quality and selectivity procedures. In less 
advanced environments, even compliant shippers or consignees can never establish a fast 
track
44: the transit operations of the World Food Program face the same problems as other 
shippers in Africa. Conversely, consignees using the service of non-professional freight 
                                                 
44 Such operators need to be 100% immune to hassle and rent seeking behavior, the most notable 
exceptions are escorted supplies to bases of NATO countries. For instance, the supplies of the French 
peace-keeping force in Ndjamena take one week ex-Ship from Douala, instead of 2 to 5 for others, using 
the same services and abiding to the same procedures, with the escort of an army jeep with a visible  flag.   40
forwarders might be worse off, but data do not necessarily show a much better 
performance by large ones. 
 
Rightly or not, the natural tendency of a public agency or terminal operator is to allocate 
the responsibility for long delays to the users or their agent. They will tend to dismiss the 
tail of the distribution as non-representative and use lead time indicators close to the 
median or even the mode to benchmark their own efficiency when dealing with efficient 
operators. 
 
A contrario, a quality driven shipper, will look at the probability of a container coming 
late to assess the induced inventory or opportunity cost. For them the relevant indicators 
will not be the mean, but the 95
th or 99
th percentile lead time and exporters will likely be 
more demanding than importers. The next section (model) will provide a precise 
formulation of the link between inventory and distribution of lead time. However, we can 
already indicate that given the shape of the typical p.d.f., switching from the median to 
the 95
th percentile translates into a twofold to fivefold difference. 
 
This question is still very much open especially for port-dwell time, and is worth further 
investigation based on individual shipment dataset: one may consider alternative model, 
where different shippers have different p.d.f. of lead time.  Although we do think (as was 
indicated above) that in the case of transit in LDCs observed distributions of lead-time 
are essentially process dependent, to avoid shipper’s bias, we have used data and 
information provided by international freight-forwarders who are experiencing stochastic 
lead-time, independent of the shipper. 
 
6.3  The Curse of Small Shipments 
 
High land transportation costs may be partially attributed to the fact that (i) landlocked 
countries export less than they import and (ii) low trade volume from/to landlocked 
countries prevent economies of scale. 
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Small Is Not Beautiful 
The impact of trade imbalance and low volume is less documented than transit overheads, 
but anecdotal evidence show that this is a major concern.  Weak positioning in the global 
market entails low trade and prevents most LLDCs from reaping scale economies.  The 
average traffic at many “major” border posts is often in the range of 5-10 containers per 
day and the busiest border post in East Africa (Malaba) only sees 200 to 300 vehicles per 
day. Rwanda or Burundi’s annual containerized imports would fit into a single large 
container vessel. This implies that almost no shipper has the required scale to have a 
strong bargaining position with global logistics groups.  Transit to Rwanda and Uganda is 
dominated by large freight forwarding groups with large truck fleet. In the case of 
Tanzania, Tanzania Railways Corporations charges 30% more for a transit container to 
Rwanda from Dar Es Salaam to Isaka (990 km) than for the same container for domestic 
traffic to Mwanza, while this town is 1,230 km from Dar on the same railway line
45.  
 
The relatively minor share of traffic to/from landlocked countries also limits their 
bargaining power for preferential treatments in coastal ports: in West Africa, transit 
traffic has not reached 10% of the total traffic through Abidjan, even when more than two 
thirds of Mali and Burkina Faso trade transited through its piers. The same can apply to 
Chad and Central African Republic with Douala and even Uganda is not more than 15% 
of the Mombasa port traffic, while the port handles 90% of its external trade.  
 
In small developing economies, including landlocked countries, arranging small-scale 
shipments and consolidating them in a single container remains an issue both in terms of 
cost and in terms of service availability.  In a case study of Laos, Arnold (2005) showed 
that availability and cost of these services are critical to export growth and 
diversification. In Central Asia Ojala et al (Ojala 2005) documented the steep increase 
occurred by loads below one container size. 
                                                 
45 Data collected from the Northern Corridor TTCA and TRC, 2005.   42
 
Table  8.  Comparison of Indicative Transport Costs from Central Asia to 
Antwerp/Rotterdam for Large and Small Exporters 
Origin  Freight tariffs in USD/ton  
(including unofficial payments) 
  Full Unit  One Ton Parcels 
Dushanbe (TAJ)  230 500 
Khujand (TAJ)  220 480 
Tashkent (UZB)  175 300 
Almaty (KAZ)  180 300 
Ashgabat (TKM)  200 400 
Baku (AZB)  163 280 
Tbilisi (GEO)  150 300 
Yerevan (ARM)  170 420 
Chisinau (MOL)  100 280 
Source:  Ojala 2005, prices as of Spring 2004. Large exporters use full 40’ containers; small exporters  
rely on consolidated parcel shipments of 1 ton. 
 
While the supply chain may be optimized for large and routine shipments (e.g. consumer 
goods (imports) or commodities (exports)), it seems that small or exceptional shipments 




Advanced logistics services for small shipments face serious trade facilitation constraints. 
In LDCs, applicable procedures under customs control constrain logistical optimization at 
sub-regional or corridor levels. Furthermore, given a lack of modern Supply Chain 
Management culture, shippers may prefer to organize consolidations themselves and use 
traditional transport means rather than pay for professional services. 
 
Diseconomies of Scale 
Some routine trade processes, such as placing international orders or arranging finance 
(e.g. letter of credit), might be more difficult and expensive in landlocked countries 
which are smaller economies with less developed trade supporting services. While transit 
                                                 
46 The causes of these shortcomings have yet to be fully clarified in case studies.   43
overheads amount to a percentage upon transportation fees and reflect the proliferation of 
procedures and rent seeking activities, administrative costs reflect the diseconomies of 
scale and impose a high penalty on smaller shipments in small and distant markets. 
 
Trade Imbalance 
Transport costs are asymmetric worldwide, especially for LLDCs.  Along the Northern 
Corridor (Rwanda to Mombasa) transporting one 20’ container by road costs 1,850 USD 
and 2,300 USD from Mombasa to Kigali (TTCA 2005) the export transport rates can be 
close to 50% of import on some rail and road links with limited return traffic.
47 Transport 
companies experience difficulties to find backload and charge the empty return in their 
import tariffs. In Central Asia, the cost of transporting a 40’ container by road between 
Central Asia and Europe varies from USD 6,000 for the West-East direction, to the  East-
West charge for transport is only USD 4,000
48.  With few exceptions, shippers are unable 
to find freight for the return journey.  
 
Expansion of the Concept of Landlocked Countries: The Emergence of “de facto” 
LLDCs?  
The quest for scale economies is vital for maritime transport.  Hummels and Skiba (2002) 
demonstrate that although Japan and Ivory Coast are equidistant from the US (West coast 
in the first case, East coast in the second case), shipping costs for imports from the Ivory 
Coast is twice as that of Japan, even adjusting for differences in the commodity 
composition.  Large trade flows are conducive to scale economies in transport, which 
lower transport costs and thereby increase trade.  The lack of scale economies creates de 
facto landlocked countries, and can apply to coastal LDCs. Because of the low volumes 
in smaller ports, shipping lines set higher tariffs to call in these ports.
49 To illustrate this 
tendency that will probably increase in the coming years, we give the example of 
exporters of fruits and vegetables from South Mauritania. Because of the maritime 
                                                 
47  Goma (DRC)-Mombasa transport costs are 2,000 USD for exports and 4,000 USD for import. 
48 For Data between Paris and Tashkent, see Raballand et al. 2005. 
49 Like Cullinane and Khanna (2000) demonstrate, the container market expanded with ever growing 
container vessels. Higher tariffs also depend on voyage length and port efficiency. The scale economies in 
ship size decline as route lengths shorten and port efficiency worsen. The last factor is weak in several 
African ports, which is conducive to higher tariffs.   44
transport price differential between Nouakchott and Dakar, exports are processed through 
the Dakar port. Despite border-crossings costs and a longer distance, they gain from this 
shift. Maritime transports differential may be very high: in West Africa, shipping lines 
charge 1,650 USD for a 40’ container from Northern Europe to Douala, but 3,450 USD to 
Malabo, which is located only 100 kilometers offshore from Douala
50. 
 
Section 7  A Quantitative Model of the Transit Supply Chain 
 
7.1  The Model 
This section presents a quantitative supply chain model identifying the impact of cost, 
delays and uncertainty in lead time.  The shipper in the landlocked country bears the 
transit cost of inland logistics operations from/to port and to/from warehouse or factory 
(of a  40’ container).  The supply chain breakdown of the logistics costs is (see section 3): 
C =    Freight  Transportation 
Costs 
Fees paid for actual transit transportation 
services to truckers or rail operators 
    +  Other Logistics Costs  transit overheads +administrative costs per 
shipment 
    +  Delays Hedging Costs  Translated in equivalent inventory cost 
 
Notations 
The transit chain is broken into steps.  Some are transport-related (moving goods between 
borders), many are not (container storage in the port terminal, transit documents, customs 
processing/ warehousing at the operator’s facilities).  For simplicity, we consider one 








                                                 
50 Data from the Europe West Africa Trade Agreement is available at www.ewata.org.   45
O =  Transit  overheads 
A  =  The administrative costs of organizing transit operations : internal costs or 
costs paid to logistics providers (for example to arrange small shipments) 
Tmean  =  The average lead time (days) of transit operation, for instance: 
Ex Ship to consignee (imports) 
Shippers to FOB (exports) 
S  =  The average time (days) between identical shipments required by the level 
of demand for such shipment (replenishment cycle) 
α  =  Fixed costs of transportation. 
β  =  Variable cost of transportation (e.g. fuel, maintenance) 
Dis  =  Average distance covered in the period 
λ  =  Load factor of truck 
m  =  Moving inventory cost 
w  =  Warehouse(d) inventory cost 
V  =  Value per shipment 
Ti  =  Mean time taken by step i 
Di  =  Distance covered during step i 
Ttrans  =  Usage of transportation vehicle (including waiting time and return)  
T  =  Total lead time (random variable) 
D  =  Distance covered in transit (one-way) 
N  =  Number of trips of transit vehicles (per month) 
 
Freight Transportation Costs 
For modeling purposes, we assume that the shipper /consignee is operating its own fleet 
(the transport operators are passing the cost to the customer).  The total cost is 
decomposed into:  Fixed and Variable costs.  The equation is: 
 
Dis × + β α  is the cost of operating per truck over the period (α is the fixed cost). 








 (1) is the Ton Per Km ( TKM) transport cost charged to the user. The 
TKM is widely used in developing countries as a reference (including in freight 
contracts). 
 
The transport cost depends on how the market is organized. 
 
a)  Efficient Trucking Market. An efficient sector, though not specialized in transit 
operations.  The user pays for truck usage based on the time of immobilization in 
the transit operation Ttrans (as if the shipper was renting the truck) and the variable 
cost adjusted for the load factor. The transit takes place over a distance D: 
D Ttrans × + ×
λ
β
α  (2) 
Where ) 1 ( _ λ − + =∑ time return ti T
i
trans  (3) is the time usage of truck for a transit 
trip. The transport time includes the time taken on the various steps for which the 
vehicle is mobilized plus the fraction of the return journey not paid for. 
 
b)  Cartel/Syndicate. This situation happens when a cartel or syndicate controls 
transit freight allocation.  The price is adjusted by the cartel for recovering the 
fixed cost (irrespective of the usage). Then, the cost per trip takes in account the 










which is independent of the transit transport time.  This is above the value 
observed in efficient markets, ceteris paribus (same cost coefficients α, β, and 
transport time). 
 
Administrative and Overhead Costs of Transit Shipments 
The two components of the administrative and overhead costs of transit shipments are:   47
O = overheads per unit shipments due to the transit related procedures and activities. O is  
fixed cost by container or trailer. 
A = Administrative costs depending on the size, nature of shipments, and the cost of 
potential consolidation. (In inventory theory, A is inversely proportional to the number of 
shipment needed to consolidate in a full load). 
 
Hedging Costs, Inventory Costs 
Moving Inventory Costs. 
For simplicity, we retain the following time linear formula based on the operational value 
of time and the mean lead time in transit: 
V T m inventory mobile mean × × = _ , where m is a cost per day of the mobile inventory. 
 
Inventory Costs Induced by the Randomness of Lead Time 
Optimal inventory management faces constraints from: 
•  Supply chain unpredictability and uncertainty in shipment delivery time.  That 
is, lead time is a random variable. 
•  The level of demand, whether predictable or stochastic. For the same industry, 
volumes are typically lower in a landlocked country as compared to the 
gateway country.  This leads to their higher inventory levels (Section 1). 
 
A comprehensive inventory model under logistics constraints is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
51  Intuitively, the value of the optimal inventory (Baumol, 1970) is the sum of: 
 
1. The classical (s,S) buffer to satisfy demand in between two shipments.  The average 
level of the buffer is  2 / S V ×  in value, and the average cost of this buffer is: 
2 / S V w × × , where w is the cost of warehousing by unit of value and time. 
 
2. Hedging inventory to account for unpredictability.  This depends on variance in lead 
time (Section 5 and Appendix 4). A simple strategy would be based on the following 
parameters to determine the safety inventory level. 
                                                 
51 Optimal inventory under logistics is a operational problem with research potential (Kaplan 1970).   48
•  A buffer to hedge delivery delays not exceeding a threshold lead time value T. 
•  The cost of stock-out exceeding the cost of warehousing w by a factor γ. 
















The choice of T should minimize the following logistics cost. 
average cost of buffer (which should be zero when T=Tmean): 
+ cost of stock-out 
Or per unit value:   ∫
∞
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Since it is difficult to distinguish between the value of time in motion and at the 
warehouse, the term V T w m mean × × − ) (  can be omitted as much smaller than the hedging 
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Operational research typically look at probability level of stock out of 1% to 5%. For a 
log normal distribution, 
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where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function, and Φ(-k)=γ. 
γ can be estimated by looking at fast shipping by air cargo as the alternative to stock out. 
For most countries under review, the incremental cost of shipping a ton of goods is in the 
range of 2,000-4,000 USD or 50,000-100,000 USD per shipment for a 40’ container. 
Supposing that the shipment is replenished every S days to satisfy the demand, the stock 
out equals a cost of 50,000-100,000/S per day as compared to 50 USD of inventory 
holding cost per shipment per day. Hence: 
γ = (1,000-2,000)/S (days) 
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Realistic values for S for a given shipment are in months. If S = 1 month, then γ = 33-67. 
For two months, γ = 17-35. (these values are consistent with typical probabilities of 
stock-outs). 
 
For distributions such as the ones listed previously and consistent with observations of 
shipments to/from LLDCs, it means that T(γ) is a multiple of the observed average lead 
time by a factor of three or more (Appendix 5). The hedging inventory level is 
computed below for the example of a median time of 13 days, including a baseline of 3 
days, and various levels of standard deviation. This data is typical of LLDCs in Western 
or Southern Africa. 
 
Table 9.  Inventory Levels and Transport Time Standard Deviation 
 
Stock Out Standard Deviation (days) 
Level 2.5 5 7.5 10
T(γ) days 
10% 25 30 35 38
5% 28 35 41 46
2.5% 31 41 49 55
1% 35 48 59 68
 
T(γ) are at least equal to twice the lead time.  This implies that the economic impact is 
twice that of inventory costs linked to the lead time.  Another illustration of this 
multiplier is from the road/rail modal choice for exports from Central Asia (Appendix 4). 
Supposing that the modal choice is due to the low reliability, hence high T(γ) of rail vis-
à-vis that of road transport: 
) ) ( (
Pr
ad TmeanforRo forRail T entory valueofinv
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The data provides for a plot of T(γ) estimated with vs. transit time for exports by rail in 
Central Asia (see Figure 8). The multiplier effect is over 4. 
 
Figure 8.  Rail Transit Time vs.  Hedging Inventory Level 














0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35


























Data Source: Ojala 2005. 
 
7.2  An Empirical Application to the Northern Corridor 
 
The Northern Corridor is the main transport artery linking the landlocked countries in 
East and Central Africa (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Eastern DR Congo and South 
Sudan) to the Mombasa port (Kenya). Up to Kampala (Uganda) transit cargo is via trucks 
or on the Kenya-Uganda railroad (Figure 9).    
 
The corridor’s performance is hampered by two factors related to infrastructure 
management and quality: (1) Kenya’s infrastructure quality and (2) rail poor 
performance.  The Governments along with donors (the World Bank and the EU) and 
complementary efforts by trans-national entities (NCTTCA and COMESA) are also 
addressing facilitation related issues through harmonizing transport and documentation 
policies (e.g. third party insurance and mutual recognition of insurance).  Despite   52
improved road transport delivery in the corridor since late 1990s (due to the well 
structured haulers and freight forwarders) the time taken to reach Rwanda is up to four 
weeks, (for a cost of 4,000 USD for a 40’ container by truck).  Also, supply chain 
predictability is low as the container may require two months to reach Rwanda.  This 
unpredictability is a major constraint for processing activities in Kenya and Uganda. 
 
Figure 9.  The Northern Corridor 
 
The main issues are: (1) the initiation of transit in Mombasa, (2) transit overregulation 
(escorts and load control) and (3) border-crossing conditions (at the Kenya/Uganda 
border).  Regional Customs, ports, other public agencies and NCTTCA are working with 
the World Bank and African Development Bank in the East Africa Trade and Transport 
Facilitation Project to improve processes and infrastructure at critical points (through 
facilities, risk management and automation). We also expect the transit regime to be 
streamlined when the project is completed.  Table 10 summarizes the impact hypotheses 
made for the various elements. 
 
These parameters are used as inputs into the model.   Although the reduction in average 
delay is significant, the expected improvement in predictability is even more dramatic (as 
shown on the next page).  
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East Africa Trade and Transport 












Port  13  9.5  Single window system  7  5 
Transit Kenya (t)  4  2.5 
Customs automation and risk 
management 3  1.5 
Border (t)  1  1.5  Joint border post  0.3  0.8 
Transit Uganda 
(t)  2 1.5 
Customs automation and risk 
management   1.5 1 
Final Rwanda  5  3 
Customs automation, single window 
system and risk management  3  1.5 
Total 25  10.5    14.8  5.6 
Technical 
Minimum  5  
 
5  
Average Excess  20      9.8   
σ log normal   0.493     0.530
(t) = link with truck transportation. 
 
On the next page, Figure 10 summarizes the probability of a shipment from the ship in 
Mombasa to a consignee in Rwanda exceeding a given delay (in days), based on the 
lognormal shape (semi-log scale). 
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As expected, the transport gains from the corridor facilitation initiative are modest (2.2 
days on average saved for the truck transport leg, with a cost of 130 USD/day, which 
amounts to 286 USD).  However, the inventory impact is significant, with the inventory 
level halved and entailing a in cost saving of 1,000 USD per shipment (or 25% of the cost 
of transport). 
 
Table 11.  Simulated Inventory Gains Depending on the Sensitivity of 
Shippers to Stock Out 
 
Risk Level   10.0% 5.0% 2.5% 1.0% 
Prior Inventory Level Days  43.0 49.9  56.9  66.7 
Inventory Level $  1720 1996  2276  2670 
Expected Inventory Level  22.2 26.0  29.9  35.5 
Gains Days  20.9 23.9  27.0  31.2 
Gains $  835 956  1080  1250 
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Section 8  Areas of Maximum Impact and Recommended Implementation 
Measures 
 
8.1  Which Trade Facilitation Measures Are Likely to Bring Most Gains? 
 
The three areas with the largest potential gains in total logistics costs are the following:  
1.  Any measure that enhances supply chain predictability and thereby reduces hedging 
costs.  
2.  Measures, some of which may be part of broader governance reforms, reducing rent-
seeking activities and therefore overhead logistics costs. 
3.  Reforming market structure by moving from a cartel/syndicate freight organization to 
an efficient market structure, inducing decreased fixed cost of transportation. 
 
Fortunately, these objectives are essentially consistent and policy measures or investment 
will typically aim at the three simultaneously. Improvement in market structure triggers 
lower costs of transportation, reduce rent opportunities, cost overheads and boosts 
professional service quality, which opens the possibility of a streamlined and efficient 
transit regime. 
 
In contrast, other objectives often sought after within trade facilitation projects (border-
crossing infrastructure, IT…) might (a) have less impact than expected or (b) prove 
difficult to be implemented. For example: 
a)  Reducing transit time through corridor facilitation measures time will not be passed to 
transport prices if the market is not efficient (a day gained in transit may mean an 
extra day in queuing if there is a regulated overcapacity as seen in section 4.2). 
b)  Influencing variable cost of transportation (e.g. fuel, maintenance) may not be easily 
achievable by simple policy measures and require substantial lobbying or multi-
stakeholder work. 
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Since the scope of this paper does not aim at identifying macro linkages, we cannot 
capture and have not focused on all potential benefits of physical investments. However, 
we can identify two direct mechanisms through which infrastructure impacts trade costs: 
(1) Poor infrastructure quality increases the variable cost component of transport 
(maintenance, tires, and fuel consumption). 
(2) Poor quality of infrastructure increases transport unreliability of the route and the cost 
of hedging unpredictability (through inventory holdings or need to choose an alternative 
mode). Reliability is a critical concern when the road is not always passable (e.g. 
unpaved sections of corridors), or when the bad condition of the infrastructure contributes 
to service breakdown (due to excessive pressure on road vehicles, washouts, or 
derailment). Hence, failure to minimally invest in infrastructure is likely to induce service 
interruption. 
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Table 12.  Potential Impact of Trade Facilitation Measures on Various Costs 
Types of Logistics Costs  Environment 
Specificities 
Potential Impact  




can be obtained in 
most cases by 
addressing 
overregulation 
Administrative Costs     ΔA  To be assessed 
(especially for small 
shipments) 
Fixed Cost of 
Transportation 
Three cases: 
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i) trans T Δ × α  efficient 
trucking market 
≈$ 90-150 xΔTrans 
 
ii) 0 for cartel/syndicate 
structure 
 
iii)  Δ (price of 
traction)*distance/load factor 
 
Only a few days (2-











better use of trucks 
(30% or more) 









major change in 
infrastructure 
condition or tax 
policy 











) (γ T V w Δ × ×  
≈ $50*Δ T(γ) 
Can be significant, 




Very important as 
improvement in 
predictability can 
reduce T(γ) by 
weeks. 
 
Looking at the various links in a given transit supply chain, the main sources of 
improvement in predictability and performance are, in order of importance:   58
1.  Improved initiation of transit at the gateway (typically the main source of 
delay and unpredictability), through a streamlined transit regime (such as 
carnet system). 
2.  Improved clearance at destination. It is typically faster than the initiation of 
transit, but is potentially a source of complication, especially for non-recurrent 
shipments due to the lack of customs capacity in small countries. 
3.  Improved and more reliable service quality. The service sector, especially 
trucking, is sometimes fragmented and some forms of queuing systems 
prevent forwarders from selecting transporters. Improvement can also target 
truck maintenance and drivers’ practices
52. 
4.  Improved efficiency of multimodal nodes:  In terms of reliable service 
delivery, road transport is usually more reliable than rail transport and 
shippers are willing to pay premium for more reliable road services if rail road 
interfaces are not optimized. 
5.  Simplified or removed en route transit procedures, such as escort, removal of 
roadblocks and other controls en route. 
6.  Improved border-crossings management. 
7.  Improved quality and management of infrastructure to reduce transport 
uncertainty, notably under bad weather conditions, when the road is not paved 
or extremely deteriorated. 
 
8.2   Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
Transport costs explain at best part of the high logistics costs of LLDCs.  Unreliability 
and vulnerability of the supply chain are even more important in constraining their 
trading and thereby growth prospects. A case-by-case, comprehensive analysis of supply 
chain bottlenecks in terms of costs (transport or overheads, time, and variance) is critical 
to identify the constraints, which have the strongest impact on competitiveness. The 
conceptual framework and quantitative tools here proposed should help in this 
assessment.  
                                                 
52 some truckers stop frequently for their own entertainment or to  make side money by transporting 
passengers or small goods.   59
 
Donors and policy makers should focus on effective implementation strategies for 
existing transport regimes and targeted enabling reforms (ports and customs) as well as 
private sector participation in service delivery. Indeed, multilateral rules for facilitating 
transit trade are well-defined and in most cases these have been endorsed in bilateral or 
sub-regional agreements by transit and landlocked countries. Policy and implementation 
initiative should target primarily the country level including the gateway country where 
many of the potential gains are to be materialized. 
 
Within these objectives the most important reforms to undertake are the following: 
 
1.  The re-engineering of the transit system of landlocked countries to change 
the paradigm from a multiple inefficient clearance system to a single efficient 
clearance.  With this end in view, these should focus on identifying and 
establishing the prerequisites for efficient transit regimes tailored to local 
conditions and specificities instead of redesigning new transit regimes. The main 
problem along several corridors lies, at least for imports, in the lack of substantial 
difference between the initiation of transit in the Port of entry and the final 
clearance in the landlocked economic center. Transit control at the border is 
artificially made complex, resulting in a “triple clearance” time. Historical 
experience suggests that a carnet system with a simple initiation may be the way 
to go, following the example of the TIR. The post war TIR had a strong impact on 
boosting intra-European trade. The carnet systems relied on a public-private 
partnership which supported the modernization of the logistics sector, while 
existing transit arrangements in LLDCs sometimes involve inefficient or rent-
seeking parastatals. An efficient transit regime will not only reduce transit time 
but will also eliminate many sources of uncertainty at initiation, en route, and at 
destination. 
 
2.  Customs reform at the national level, as a prerequisite for functional sub-
regional systems:   60
•  In the gateway, customs reforms should convey a positive approach to transit, 
implement proper documentation and transit information management, and 
promote implementation of working carnet systems. 
•  Inland transit and destination countries capacities should be reinforced to 
operate transit (border management) and final clearance. 
 
3.  Transport services reforms through policy or incentive measures: 
•  Termination of obsolete freight repartition systems (queuing and “tours de 
role”); 
•  Concession of transport activities, such as railways, port operations, and road 
and logistics services when they still remain in the public domain (as in 
several African and Central Asian countries); and 
•  Support to industry consolidation and partnerships with global logistics 
operators, through transparent business regulations, appropriate incentives 
and, in road transport, enforcement of axle-load control. Financial assistance 
from international business partners and international financial organizations 
to allow the emergence of structured operators may also help (IFC provided 
initial support to key players in consolidating Kenya’s trucking sector in the 
early 2000s and more recently in Rwanda). 
 
Other important measures are: 
•  A coordinated corridor facilitation program, as it can bring several benefits such 
as improved border-crossings, better information-sharing, bottleneck 
identification and solutions finding to address them. Corridor cooperation can also 
lead to for more in depth re-engineering of the transit systems. 
•  Investing in road infrastructure and maintenance, so as to maintain all weather 
capability of corridors and reliability of service delivery. This qualitative 
threshold is important to eliminate a significant source of unreliability. 
Improvement in rail infrastructure and rolling stock is also crucial in some 
corridors to improve service efficiency. On the other hand, creating supply driven 
infrastructure may not always bear fruits, especially as there as few capacity   61
constraints on corridors serving LLDCs, except localized congestion in the 
vicinity of capital or port cities. In general, maintaining existing infrastructure in a 
reliable condition is the priority and can require significant external funding.  
•  IT investment can also bring tangible benefits. Computerizing transit 
documentation as part of a customs modernization reform can reduce the time 
spent in initiating transit or in final clearance. ASYCUDA and other systems 
comprise transit modules technically easy to implement when border posts are 
connected to headquarters. While real-time cargo tracking may bring 
improvements, it remains controversial. It is enhancing a vision of transit as a 
chain of control and thereby imposing intrusive constraints on the private sector 
instead of implementing a better partnership with compliant operators. For this 
reason, real-time tracking is not a pre-requisite for functioning transit systems in 
industrialized countries.  
 
The possibility of developing air transport-based trade needs exploration. Indeed, most 
constraints experienced in land transport would not apply to air transport services (even if 
the small scale of many economies tends to limit services to landlocked countries to 
feeders). Empirical evidence in Africa suggests that no landlocked country has tried to 
establish strong air transport based trade policies even though public investment levels 
needed are much less than for the other modes, and air transport should be ideal to 
develop highly time-sensitive and high value-added activities. 
 
Complementary research is required in at least three areas: (1) An understanding of the 
mechanisms linking the structure and magnitude of logistics costs (especially the cost of 
uncertainty) and competitiveness; (2) Deeper understanding of the necessary pre-
conditions and enabling policies to implement efficient transport and transit schemes: 
trucking sector reform, case of small shipment, political economy of transit friendly 
reform…. ; and (3) Empirical investigation of supply chain performance and its nexus 
with traders’ behaviour, inventory holdings or modal choices needs detailed assessment, 
when shipment level data is available for various type of products.  
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Finally the main objective of transit facilitation projects is to provide an enabling 
environment that offers global market connectivity and links locally based logistics 
services to global networks. The measures needed are not necessarily high in terms of 
monetary resources, but require strong political commitment. 
 
In terms of donor funding, most actions above do not require major investment, except 
for critical infrastructure but the donor community’s intervention may be critical to 
provide an external “honest broker” role (and to crystallize sometimes conflicting 
positions within stakeholders). 
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  West Africa  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa  Central Asia 
Ports of Entry (main) Abidjan, Tema, Lomé, 
Cotonou, Dakar 
Douala  Mombasa, Das es Salam  Durban, + 
Walvis bay, 
Mozambique, Dar 




Mali, Burkina, Niger  Chad, Central African 
Republic 
Uganda, Rwanda, 




Lesotho, Southern DRC 
Central Asia 
Geography of Corridors  Interconnected corridors 




Two parallel corridors 
with limited competition 
between them. 




Maputo and Walvis 
bay). Landlocked 
countries are also served 
directly by corridors in 
Mozambique (Beira) 
and from Dar es Salam. 
Extensive rail and road 
network inherited from 
the Soviet Union. 
Remoteness of 
Landlocked Countries 
1000 km  1200-1800 km  1000 to 1600 km  1000 to 2000 km  3000-4000 km 
Performance 
Typical Transit Time 



















Depending on mode of 
transportation: 
2-3 weeks (Baltics) 
7-10 days 
Appendix 1.  Features and Performance of the Main Trade Corridors Serving Landlocked Developing Countries 
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  West Africa  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa  Central Asia 
Directional Unbalance 
of Trade 
Medium  High  High  Moderate to High   Moderate to High 





≈ 2 xEurope 
High 
≈ 1.5x Europe 
Medium 
≈ Europe 
Moderate for road, low 
for rail (but very long 
distances) 
Import 40’ or Trailer  €2500  €7000  $3000- 4000  $3000  $7000 
Transit Facilitation Framework 











Customs and transport 
integration (high in 
UEMOA, less with 
Anglophones countries) 
Regional and bilateral 
transit treaties 
Customs and transport 
integration (less 
effective than in 
UEMOA) 






Effective role of SADC 
in enforcing regional 
transportation policies. 
Gaps with Mozambique 
Nominally, European 
transit instruments are 
available (TIR, TIF). 
Intensity of Rent 
Seeking Activities 
High Very  high  High Medium-High  High 
Trucking Services  Very fragmented. 
Excessive overloading. 
Very fragmented. 
freight allocation and 
rates controlled by 
official bodies and 
interest groups with 
compulsory. 
Consolidated in Kenya  
Fragmented in Tanzania 
Consolidated, with 
dominance of South 
African 
Protected cartels in 
landlocked countries 
Very fragmented. 
Appendix 1.  Features and Performance of the Main Trade Corridors Serving Landlocked Developing Countries 
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  West Africa  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa  Central Asia 
Train Services  Good   Good   Poor  Adequate from South 
Africa but not much in 
use for general cargo. 
Very poor on other 
corridors. 
Adequate, but slower 
than road. 
Main Facilitation Issues  Overregulation of 




Hassle en route  
Inefficient transit 
regime. 
Final customs clearance. 
Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire 
Transit time in port 
Overregulation of 
trucking, queuing 
systems, and rent 
seeking activities. 




Final customs clearance. 
Infrastructure. 
Transit time in ports. 







Congestion in Durban,  
Border delays. 
Distance from Durban. 




Tanzania, due to very 
poor performance and 
predominance of SA as 
a hub. 
Border delayas and 
number of crossings. 
Political issues between 
countries in the sub-
region. 
Lagging customs reform 
in core countries. 
Market structure limits 
the implementability of 
TIR. 
Positive Factors  Improvement in port 
and customs efficiency 










EAC Customs Union 
project.  
Customs reforms in the 
landlocked countries 
and leading role of 
South Africa (customs, 
private sector) in trade 
facilitation. 
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Appendix 3.  Examples of Dispersion in Lead Time  
in Latin America, Southeast Europe, and North America 
 
1.  Argentina-Brazil border on the Buenos Aires-San Paolo Corridor 


















Source: World Bank. 
 
2.  Border Crossing Time in Southeast Europe 
 
   Crossing Time (minutes)   
Border Post  Country of Entry Average  Std Dev  95th Percentile Trucks Observed 
Durres Albania  204  393  345 1438 
Qafe Thane  Albania  69  127  160 870 
Tirana1 Albania  731  491  1355 96 
Tirana Albania  418  622  1561 721 
B.Gradiska Bosnia  40  67  135 3175 
Banja Luka  Bosnia  239  229  772 913 
Grude Bosnia  90  91  200 1771 
Izacic Bosnia  64  113  240 3269 
Orasje Bosnia  211  262  824 8556 
Raca Bosnia  108  152  450 3010 
Gyueshevo Bulgaria  27 103  70 5068 
Plovdiv A  Bulgaria  202  219  450 239 
Plovdiv B  Bulgaria  39  96  126 238 
Plovdiv Bulgaria  182  661  435 2350 
Plovdiv Special  Bulgaria  17  10  33 46 
Rousse Bulgaria  36  46  99 11073 
Vidin Bulgaria  70  61  132 214 
Gradiska Croatia  21  42  90 2510 
Jankomir Croatia  220  255  590 11186 


























De Brasil a Argentina De Argentina a Brasil  73
Source: Customs Adviser to the TTFSE Project and Authors’ Calculation. (2002  
survey one month period) 
 
 
3.  USA Land Borders 
 
Border Post  State of Entry  Baseline   Average   95th Percentile  
Ambassador bridge  Michigan  5.7  8.8  13.9 
Blaine Crossing  Washington  8.1  17.3  35.6.3 
Blue Water  Michigan  11.1  34.2  80.3 
Peace Bridge  New York  8.3  21.5  83.4 
World Trade  Texas  12.2  31.2  54.9 
Time in minutes 
Source:  DOT (2002 survey). Office of Freight Management .   74
Appendix 4.  Revealed Modal Choices and the Value of Time 
 
Central Asia is one of the few regions where rail and road are effectively competing, since the modal choice 
is between: 
•  A faster but more expensive road freight; and 
•  A slower (twice as slow) but cheaper (60%) rail or multimodal service, 
The combined price and delay data reveals information about the value of time for the shipper. A back of 
the envelope estimate is: 
port yroadtrans dayssavedb





Table 13  Indicative Transport Cost and Transit Time for Large Exporters for a 40’ Container by 
Road or Rail to Antwerp/Rotterdam, ( in USD, including unofficial payments) 
 
  Freight in USD  Rail/Road
Discount 




  Road  Rail & Sea
53 %  Road  Rail  USD/day 
Dushanbe (TAJ)  9,200  3,400  63%  15 28  446 
Khujand (TAJ)  9,000  3,000  67%  14 26  500 
Tashkent (UZB)  7,000  2,800  60%  12 23  382 
Almaty (KAZ)  8,000  3,000  63%  13 21  625 
Ashgabat (TKM)  8,000  3,300  59%  14 28  336 
Baku (AZB)  7,000  2,700  61%  13 24  391 
Tbilisi (GEO)  6,000  2,500  58%  12 24  292 
Yerevan (ARM)  7,000  2,800  60%  14 30  263 
Chisinau (MOL)  4,000  2,000  50%  7 14  286 
Source: Ojala 2005 and Authors’ Calculations. 
 
This data implies a rather high value of time, on average, about 370 USD per day for a 40’ container, a 
value close to Hummels’ estimate, although the data and the reasoning are completely different. However, 
shippers’ preference is likely to include other information, which explains why the figure is largely in 
excess of plausible inventory cost for a 40’ (less than 100 USD). For instance, for time-sensitive goods, the 
choice is likely to be influenced more by the predictability (low) of the railroad system, meaning that the 
denominator in the above formula should not be the difference in mean lead time, but higher value reflecting 
a safety coefficient. As argued in the section on inventories, delays and predictability, and according to the 
model in Appendix 5, this coefficient can be high. 
                                                 
53 For Central Asian countries, rail transport to a Baltic port and from there by container feeder ship to Antwerp; for South 
Caucasus countries, by ship to Odessa in Ukraine and from there on by rail; for Moldova, rail all the way.   75
Appendix 5.  The Distribution of Lead Time and the Log-Normal Fit  
 
Trying to provide a robust stochastic model of trade logistic processes is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, intuitive reasoning points to a distribution of lead time, as observed, very asymmetric with a 
broad tail. Indeed, transit in developing countries is the sum of component processes for which the lead time 
is widely distributed, due to their effective unpredictability. A sum of a finite number of such processes will 
converge slowly towards a bell shaped normal law and will look rather governed by an asymmetric 
distribution law of positive numbers. 
 
The problem is analogous to other problems of distribution of sizes or intensities over wide ranges found in 
other branches of science such as: reliability theory (distribution of failure of mechanical devices), geology, 
biology, signal theory, and of course size and income distribution in economics. 
 
Hence, there are few natural candidates to fit the actual distribution of lead time, such as Weibull, Gumbel 
(extreme value distribution), or Birbaum Saunders. Empirically, the ubiquitous lognormal is very adequate 
to simulate asymmetric broad tail distribution of positive numbers, departing from the Gaussian shape, but 
not too dramatically. In assessing reliability/inventory costs, we are essentially interested in fitting a range 
of intermediate values, (within two sigmas in log) which incorporates rare (1%), but not extreme events. 
Hence the asymptotic properties of the distribution are not as relevant, as the flexibility in fitting 
intermediate values. 
 
Beyond, the good fit with existing data (examples below), two practical considerations back the choice of 
the lognormal law for modeling. First, it is most versatile for calculations in closed form (at least in terms of 
special functions), including all the formulas of the proposed inventory model. Furthermore, the sum of log-
normally distributed independent distribution, with similar scale parameter, is with a good level of 
approximation, very close to a log-normal distribution, the two first moments (mean, variance) of which are 
the sum of the moments of the components (Fenton-Wilkinson approximation).. It means that one can 
extrapolate the distribution of the overall transit lead time, from information on the component process, and 
the hypothesis of statistical independence. This property has been used to simulate the cost on the Northern 
Corridor (section 7.2)   76
 
Addition of Log-Normal Random Variables 
 
The sum of normally distributed random variables is also normally distributed. Hence, as it is well known, the product of log-
normally distributed random process is also a lognormal process. However, in the case of the distribution of lead time, we are 
looking for the distribution of the total lead time of a sum of individual steps in the logistics chain, each of which has an 
asymmetric log-normal type of lead-time distribution. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no such simple rule for the sum of log-normal random variable. In fact, even the characteristic function of 
the log-normal distribution cannot be expressed in terms of elementary or special functions, which would have allow for a closed 
estimate of the sum, supposing that the components are independent log-normally distributed variables. 
 
However, for practical purposes, the probability distribution function (p.d.f.) of a sum of log-normally distributed independent 
variables is itself very close to another log-normal distribution, with the same mean and variance. With the increase of the 
number of components, the trend towards a Gauss Curve occurs through the narrowing of a family of asymmetric quasi-
lognormal curves. The parameters on the compound log-normal will be estimated by equating the fist two moments (average and 
variance), rule known as the Fenton-Wilkinson approximation (Fenton 1960).This observation, of high practical interest to 
scientists and engineers has been made for a long time initially by communication engineers. 
 
We could not find a definitive rigorous explanation for this empirical good fit, in the literature. A plausible argument stems from 
Cramer’s large deviation theorem, which extends the central limit theorem to large deviations from the mean. In loose terms
54, 
the theorem states that the Sum of N identically distributed variables converges, for large N, uniformly towards a distribution 
expressed in terms of a loss or Cramer’s function S: 
 
N   large for     )
N
X
S(   N ) X PDF(X Log
N
1 i
















= . The limit normal law corresponds to the first Taylor’s term 
around the minimum of S.  
 
                                                 
54 A primer on this not totally trivial convergence phenomenon, is:U. Frisch, D. Sornette “Extreme deviations and applications”. 
Phys. I France 7, 1155-1171 (1997), or Arxiv.org/cond-mat/9705   77
Log-normal fit of actual data. 
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While the Tmedian lead time is the scale parameter of the distribution, its shape parameter σ is linked to the 
coefficient of variation CV (standard deviation of t divided by the mean time). 
 
1 ) exp( CV
2 − = σ  (A3), and conversely  ) CV 1 ln(
2 + = σ . It means that for practical range of CV 
observed for our problem (0.5 to 2), σ will be relatively close to one. 
 





median mean CV 1 * T )
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median mode CV 1
T ) exp( * T T
+
= − = σ  (A5) 
 
Depending on the source, the data on lead times in available either by individual shipments or already in 
terms of a discrete cumulative distribution function (histogram of the cdf). In the first case, the parameters   78
of the fitting distribution are estimated from the distribution of ln(t). In the second case, ln(t) is fitted against 
the inverse normal distribution of the cumulative values (normal probability plot). 
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In this case the data was given as the histogram of the cdf, and the underlying equation is: 
 
  ) T ln( ) (% ) t(days ln median
1 + > Φ × =
− t dwelltime σ , and the parameters are: 
 
Σ .774    (t=86) 
Ln(Tmedian) 2.08  (t=126) 
R² .99 
1997  Containers 60 cumulative values 
Lowest-highest  Same day (1)- 79 days 
Implied values 
CV .91 
Tmedian 8  days 
Tmode 4.4  days 
Tmean 11  days 
 
 
Example 2: Distribution of Delays Taken at Selected Entry Points in Eastern Europe 
 
The source is a 2002 one month truck survey, implemented as part of the Trade and Transport Facilitation 
For Southern Europe Survey (TTFSE). 
 
Observations are the delays (hours) experienced by trucks entering the country in transit. 
Kernel densities are plotted for the logarithm of the delay as well as the fitting (log-normal) distribution.  79
 
Number of Observations 11073, σ=.844 
Number of Observations 913, σ=.88 
Number of Observations 214, σ=.53 
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Simulation of the Optimal Inventory Level 
 























































































where k is the number of standard deviation corresponding to the risk level γ (inverse standard normal function): 
∫
∞ −






































γ  (A7), combining this expression and the one for the coefficient in variation, the plot shows a quasi linear 
dependence of the ratio  Tmean
T ) (γ upon the coefficient of variation, with rather steep multiplier. For a 5% risk level and a coefficient 
of variation of 1, the inventory level is about 4 times the mean (Fig A5-2). These large multipliers are a consequence of the broad 
tail in the lead time distribution. They are substantially higher than the traditional rule, based on normal distributions (Baumol, 
1970). It adds to the mean a buffer time which is the number of standard deviations multiplied by a coefficient k which is the 
confidence interval of the normal law:  
   81
CV k Tmean Tmean × × + (A8) 
 
For instance, for a risk level of 5% the corresponding values for the two models are: 
 
  CV 0.5 0.75  1
Proposed model 
Tmean
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